IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6061 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 467468/2020 @D..No.36919/2018)
The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
1The Appellant now almost 80 years old, was undisputedly the owner of land admeasuring about 3.34 Hectares comprised in Khata/Khatuni No. 105 min/127, Khasra No. 70 in Tika Jalari Bhaddirain, Mauja Jalari, Tehsil Nadaun, Dist. Hamipur, Himachal Pradesh.
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2020.01.08 16:52:42 IST
the Nadaun – Sujanpur Road, a major District Road without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings, or following due process of law.
The construction of the road was completed by 1975. 3The Appellant, being an illiterate widow, coming from a rural
background, was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlement in law, and did not file any proceedings for compensation of the land compulsorily taken over by the State.
4In 2004, some similarly situated persons whose lands had also been taken over by the
The High Court vide Order dated 23.04.2007, allowed CWP No.1192 of 2004, and directed the
5Pursuant to the Order of the High Court in 2008, the
the Writ Petitioners, and not the other landowners whose lands had also been taken over.
6The Appellant submits that she learnt of these proceedings in 2010, when she alongwith her two daughters filed C.W.P. No. 1736 of 2010 before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, praying that the State be directed to pay compensation for the land acquired in
The State has further admitted that a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued in 2008
with respect to the land of Anakh Singh a neighbouring land owner, whose land was similarly taken over for the same purpose. Furthermore, the Writ Petition was barred by laches, since the road was constructed in
7The High Court vide the impugned Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2013 held that the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in Writ proceedings. The Appellant was granted liberty to file a Civil Suit.
8Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a Review Petition against the Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2013 which was dismissed vide Order dated 13.05.2014.
9The Appellant has filed the present Appeals before this Court, to challenge the Judgment dated 11.09.2013 passed in the Writ Petition and Order dated 13.05.2014 passed in the Review Petition.
10We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10.1.The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution.
Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property1, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
10.2.The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.3
1 The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
3 K T Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1.
To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution.
Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this Court
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.”
4 (2005) 7 SCC 627.
5 (2008) 15 SCC 517.
In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.
&Ors.6, this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this
Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
10.3.In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her
6 (2011) 9 SCC 354.
7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596.
payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
10.4.The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
10.5.In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.8 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.
8 (2013) 1 SCC 353.
Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.
10.6.We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
10.7.The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is
a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.9
In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows :
“There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article
9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353.
32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”
11In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the Appellant.
12 The State has submitted that in 2008 it had initiated acquisition proceedings in the case of an adjoining land owner viz. Shri Anakh Singh pursuant to a direction given by the High Court in C.W.P.No.1192 of 2004. The State initiated acquisition only in the case where directions were issued by the High Court, and not in the case of other land owners whose lands were compulsorily taken over, for the same purpose, and at the same time. As a consequence, the present land owner has been driven to move the Court in their individual cases for redressal.
13In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, the
It is informed that an appeal has been preferred by Ravinder Singh s/o Anakh Singh & Ors. being RFA No.35 of 2016 which is pending before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla.
Taking note thereof, if an appeal is filed by the present appellant within 8 weeks from the date of compensation being paid to her by the State, the appeal will be treated to be within limitation, and would be decided on its own merits in accordance with law.
The RespondentState is directed to pay legal costs and expenses of Rs.1,00,0000/ to the present appellant.
14 The Appeals are accordingly allowed. The Orders dated 11.09.2013 and 13.05.2014 passed by the High Court are set aside.
January 08, 2020.